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VENEZUELA'S ECONOMIC CRISIS: 
ORIGINS AND SUCCESSES IN STABILIZATION 
By Robert E. Looney 
Venezuela is embroiled in the worst economic crisis it has 
experienced in more than two decades. The crisis began in 
1983 and is marked by heavy foreign debt, a stagnant economy, 
the highest unemployment on record, a general lack of con· 
fidence, uncertain revenues from oil exports, an unstable 
currency and a government burdened with bloated payrolls 
and a host of money-losing state enterprises. 
Throughout the post-war period until the end of the 1970s 
Venezuela experienced continuous high economic growth. The 
pace of growth accelerated during the free-spending years 
following on the first world oil price shock in 1973-74. How-
ever, momentum began to be lost in 1978, and a long period of 
stagnation commenced the following year as the authorities 
reined in expenditure to cool-down what was considered an 
overheated economy. The picture worsened when oil revenues 
began to fall from the peak value of $19.1 billion attained in 
1981. 
The crisis finally broke in February of 1983. The bolivar was 
devalued through the introduction of a complicated multi-tiered 
exchange rate regime, and an elaborate control system was 
established to disburse preferential dollars for imports and 
foreign debt payments. At the same time a moratorium was 
declared on the amortisation of the 2 7 .5 billion dollar overseas 
debt of the public sector, and negotiations were started for the 
restructuring of these obligations. 
Venezuela's years of economic boom and easy money are 
over. Income from petroleum exports - which make up around 
95 percent of Venezuela's total exports - are the barometer of 
the nation's economic activity, and have declined significantly 
since 1983 with little improvement in sight. The country today 
faces a combination of economic, financial and social problems 
greater than any seen since the tumultuous days of the early 
1960s. Clearly much of the countries current problems can 
be traced to wasteful spending. This survey seeks to trace the 
developments leading up to the current economic crisis. An 
analysis of the government's response to the crisis is made in 
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an attempt to determine whether the country will soon return 
to its historical budgetary patterns. 
Origins of the 1983-1986 Economic Crisis 
From 1974 to 1978, Venezuela's gross domestic product 
(GDP) rose by around 5 percent a year as the government 
of President Carlos Andres Perez used abundant petroleum 
revenues plus proceeds from foreign borrowing to finance an 
ambitious public investment program and heavy spending in 
social services. ( 1) Besides frenzied economic activity, the 19 7 4-
19 7 8 period was, characterized by unbridled government spend-
ing, -increased inflation, burgeoning state bureaucracy, short-
ages of common consumption items, deteriorating public 
services, corruption and high levels of waste and inefficiency. 
The administration of President Luis Herrera Campins, 
which took office in March of 1979, attempted to cope with 
the major imbalances which had developed during the previous 
period: (2) 
1. The government pushed ahead with ongoing develop-
ment projects; 
2. The authorities pursued a restrictive monetary 
policy; 
3. Officials allowed many prices to be freed from con-
trols; 
4. At least at the outset, the government adopted a 
generally pro-business attitude. 
However, with the new wave of oil price increases in 1978-
1979, the Herrera government began to repeat most of its 
predecessor's errors. (3) The record thus far shows tha~ under 
the Herrera administration (1979-1984), the country experi-
enced almost no growth in real GDP. Since 1979, the economy 
has been characterized by: 
1. Rising unemployment, 
2. Substantial increases in imports, 
3. A serious weakening of foreign reserves, 
4. High inflation (1978-1981) followed by a significant 
reduction beginning in 1982, 
5. An even larger state bureaucracy, and 
6. Continued heavy financial losses by government-
owned enterprises. 
Complicating these problems further was the government's 
incompetent planning and management of its foreign debt. 
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Eventually by 1983, the administration had slid into a full-
blown crisis. 
Major problems in the international oil market in 1982(4) 
caused a sharp decrease in income from exports, while general 
government mismanagement is estimated to have cost some $8 
billion. 
Early in 1983, continued weakness on the world oil market, 
plus inability to refinance maturing government external debt, 
caused capital outflows to gain momentum: the authorities 
imposed exchange controls in mid-February and instituted a 
three-tiered exchange rate for the Venezuelan bolivar. 
The Herrera administration also began to recognize early in 
1983 that it would not be able to repay to foreign banks the 
more than $18 billion in interest and principal coming due in 
1983-1984. This inability to pay was the result both of the 
government's failure to establish a practical debt service profile 
(considerable short-term borrowing carried out in 1980-1981 
was allowed to accumulate), and the reluctance of many inter-
national banks to refinance government debt in Latin America 
in the wake of the 1982 Falklands War. 
At the beginning of 1983, the government began asking 
banks to grant a moratorium on principal payments for most of 
its outstanding loans. Talks have been underway to reschedule 
much of Venezuela's public foreign debt. 
In short, the beginning of 1983 was marked by an external 
payments crisis ( 5) brought about by a heavy accumulation of 
external public debt service obligations, a virtual halt of capital 
flows from international sources of credit, a drop in export 
earnings and - because of expectations of devaluation - a 
substantial outflow of foreign exchange through capital flight. 
In February 1983, as losses of international reserves mounted 
and debt service obligations fell behind schedule, the long-
standing fixed exchange rate policy under which foreign curren-
cies were freely bought and sold was replaced by a system of 
temporary exchange controls. These controls operated through 
a three-tiered exchange market system. At the same time, exten-
sions on the payment of arrears on short-term external public 
debts to creditor banks continued to be granted. Meanwhile, the 
new exchange control system and depressed domestic demand 
led to a sharp drop in imports. The crisis in the external sector 
and its contradictory effects on income and public spending, 
together with the measures which the government adopted to 
. 
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deal with the crisis, brought down real personal income, in 
turn leading to depressed domestic consumption and a drop in 
investment, particularly in private construction and inventories. 
In the external sector, the drop in international oil prices and 
the OPEC quotas on export volumes led to an 11 percent 
decrease in export earnings. Nevertheless, the current account 
balance showed a surplus of $5.017 billion, since the value of 
imports fell by 61 percent and net expenditures for foreign 
travel by 69 percent. These declines were due to the domestic 
recession and the introduction of the new exchange control 
system. 
The non-monetary capital account balance shifted from a 
large net inflow in 1982 to a deficit of $4.57 billion in 1984. 
This reversal was caused by a virtual cessation of flows of 
external financial credit and by outlays for amortization of 
medium- and long-term external debt. This result, together with 
exchange controls and discouragement of capital flight, plus a 
modest inflow of monetary capital ($240 million), produced a 
virtual equilibrium in the balance of payments, in contrast to 
the high deficit of the previous year. By the close of fiscal 1983, 
the Central Bank's international reserves had improved slightly 
to $11.149 billion. This figure was about one and a half times 
the value of the external debt service in 1984, assuming that the 
rescheduling obtained did not include short-term debt amortiza-
tion in that year. 
Treasury expenditures continued to feel the expansionary 
effects of public interest payments (including some amortiza-
tion) and the cost of the Ceritral Government's operating 
expenditures. However, the Treasury did not pay the entire 
external public debt that had matured since 1983 because of 
the moratorium that was in effect. In addition, tr an sf ers to the 
rest of the public sector, subsidies for consumer spending and 
production, and direct and indirect investment by the govern-
ment all fell substantially. The net result has been a slight rise in 
total central government spending from 27 .8 to 28.2 percent of 
GDP. 
Lower oil earnings, substantially smaller imports, and declin-
ing production and domestic trade led to a reduction of almost 
17 percent in current Treasury revenue relative to 1982. The 
changes in the exchange system, along with the fiscal share of 
the reappraised value of gold reserves, however, gave the govern-
ment a special source of revenue eqyivalent to 22 percent of 
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the previous year's total revenue. Counting resources from the 
smaller sources, the net effect of these developments was an 
increase in current revenue from 26 percent of GDP in 1982 to 
27.4 percent in 1983, and a drop in the fiscal deficit from 1.5 
to 0.8 percent of GDP. 
At the same time, private domestic investment fell to 25 
percent of its 1979 level, unemployment doubled to an official 
15 percent, real GDP fell by 4.8 percent and private per capita 
consumption fell by 6 percent. 
The Central Government budget for 1984 called for spending 
of Bs 74 billion with 56 percent marked for current expendi-
tures, 23 percent for debt service and only 21 percent for 
investments. The government managed to raise outlays but was 
restrained by IMF economic pressure. 
As a result in 1984, the Central Government spent Bs 85.9 
billion as compared by Bs 92.2 billion in 1981 and Bs 68.6 bil-
lion in 1980. The overall government deficit for 1983 (including 
Central Government state-owned enterprises, autonomous insti-
tutions, etc.) was Bs 9.5 billion, down from Bs 25 billion in 
losses in 1982 and Bs 9 .9 billion in deficit in 1981. 
In short, the government's economic and monetary policy in 
recent years has earned poor grades. Its goals of achieving 
economic growth, attracting new investment (foreign and 
domestic), creating new jobs in the private sector, maintaining 
monetary stability and foreign reserves, and instilling con-
fidence in the economy had been a dismal failure. Inflation, 
one of the government's prime targets, was controlled in 1982 
through restrictive monetary policies but flared up again in 
1983 and 1984 and was expected to continue to rise in 1985. 
Efforts to control foreign borrowing by state agencies and 
repay foreign debt have been totally unsuccessful and the 
country is now faced with the need to reschedule its public 
and private sector debt. The government-owned financial insti-
tutions (excluding the Central Bank and Venezuelan Invest-
ment Fund) have been major money losers; oft-stated official 
goals in health, education, housing a_nd other social services 
have logged results ranging from fair to poor. 
In summary, Venezuela's crisis has been essentially financial, 
triggered by a sharp fall in its oil export income (from $19.1 
billion in 1981 to $15.81 billion in 1984) and an inability to 
continue borrowing abroad. An overvalued currency and mas-
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sive capital flight progressively worsened Venezuela's inter-
national financial position and the country and its banks came 
to realize that it had a massive debt, largely short term, which 
could not be paid when due. The country is gradually having to 
readjust to the need to live with sharply reduced oil revenues 
without new foreign borrowing. 
Politically, broad divisions existed between the Social 
Christian government of Herrera and the opposition Democratic 
Action Party (AD). As late as 1983, Herrera and his advisors 
continued to insist upon austerity, a reordering of government 
finances and assignment of higher priority to social welfare 
than to infrastructural .development. Critics attacked the 
absence of economic growth, rising inflation and unemploy-
ment, and alleged bureaucratic mismanagement. Agreement 
on the undesirability of inflation, unemployment, a stagnant 
agricultural sector and the like did not provide accord on 
measures to improve the economy. (6) In general, the Presi-
dent's policies reflected a commitment to a form of modified 
Thatcherism: a curbing of wasteful public spending and ration-
alization of investments in agriculture, power, housing, social 
programs, etc. The opposition AD promised a new approach to 
the economy and won the general election in December 1983. 
The Lusinchi Austerity Program 
The new administration of Jaime Lusinchi set the govern-
ment's major economic priorities at rebuilding investor con-
fidence and making full use of private sector's productive 
potential to reactivate the national economy. In addition, the 
new administration's specific economic goals are to create new 
jobs, control inflation, gradually unify the bolivar's exchange 
rate and balance the nation's international accounts. The 
immediate priority has been to reschedule the public sector's 
forei~ debt and implement a plan for refinancing the public 
sector;s foreign loans. (7) 
The Lusinchi administration's economic program, essentially 
complete by mid-1984, was aimed at making the government 
more efficient and at cushioning the impact of readjustment on 
the poorer strata of society. Specific measures included: (8) 
1. Exchange Controls: While the multiple rate system has 
been continued, the bolivar has been further devalued by 
moving most imports previously on the Bs 4.3 and Bs 6.0 lists 
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to Bs 7.5/dollar. Essential food imports and medicines remain 
at Bs 4.3/dollars, as do principal repayments on private debt 
and public enterprise debt, 
Travel abroad, profit remittances, personal financial transfers, 
and certain imports and exports other than Petroleos de Vene-
zuela and Ferrominera (the government-owned iron ore mining 
and exporting firm) are at the open market exchange rate, 
currently at about Bs 12/dollar. 
2. Price Controls: The Law of Cost, Prices and Salaries, 
passed in early July 1984, replaces the administered price 
system, which had placed controls on all prices. The new 
system provides for a special commission to exercise control 
over prices of all basic necessities. The panel is made up of three 
cabinet members (insuring a government majority), a member 
from the principal private sector organization (Fedcamaras) and 
one from the Venezuelan Labor Federation (CTV). The com-
mission's determination on prices of basic necessities (i.e., mass 
consumption goods and services) will be binding unless over-
ruled by the government in special cases. Prices on other pro-
ducts and services are apparently not scheduled to be formally 
controlled, but government offices have warned firms not to 
increase prices unreasonably. 
3. Controls on Imports: Widespread import controls remain 
in effect. In addition, the exchange control system is being used 
to limit the amount of foreign exchange for import of products 
(e.g., capital goods, computers) which qualify for preferential 
foreign exchange. Through such import restrictions, the govern-
ment hopes to boost domestic import-substituting industries. 
4. Government Austerity: Public sector receipts and expen-
ditures were virtually in balance in. 1984-85, with a surplus 
achieved in 1985. On the income side, this reflects increased 
revenues from foreign exchange profits and petroleum price 
increases. While new social programs will add significantly 
to government expenditures, the administration is continuing to 
hold down capital expenditures, and has decided ori a 10 per-
cent reduction in regular c-urrent outlays. 
In addition, the administration has begun to liquidate two 
major money losers, the Venezuelan Development Corporation 
(CVF) and the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (CMA), and 
to reorganize many of the hundreds of other state-owned 
enterprises and agencies. Salaries of public sector employees 
. 
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earning over Bs 16,000 per month have been cut by 10 percent 
and those earning over Bs 10,000 per month are not to receive 
salary increases. 
5. Socz"al Welfare: The government has announced various 
measures to protect labor and other less advantaged groups 
from the effects of the recession and devaluation. Employers 
are required to pay workers earning less than Bs 3000 per 
month a "transportation bonus" of Bs 100 per month. Private 
enterprises with 10 or more employees are required to increase 
their employment by 10 percent from January 31 levels. Private 
firms with 50 or more employees are also obliged to provide 
subsidized employee cafeteria facilities, or a payment to cover 
a daily meal. A special employment program (to provide main-
tenance work on a nationwide scale) uses private contractors 
for public works maintenance and eventually will employ up 
to 100,000 workers, 20,000 in the first phase. The Family 
Food Basket program will provide Bs 300 to Bs 900 per month 
in food coupons to an estimated 970,000 families with monthly 
incomes below Bs 2000. 
Budget restraint, including restrictions on both capital spend-
ing and ordinary current expenditures, has resulted in balanced 
public sector accounts. While price controls are being used to 
prevent excessive inflation, some price liberalization is under-
way. Social measures include a 10 percent increase in private 
sector employment, a Bs 100 per month transportation bonus 
and subsidized meals for workers earning less than Bs 3000 per 
month. Inflation, which was less than 10 percent in 1983, may 
however be in the 15-20 percent range for 1984-1985.(9) 
External Debt 
In terms of resolving the country's external debt cns1s, 
foreign banks originally indicated they would not agree to a 
rescheduling unless the IMF gives its approval to an acceptable 
economic recovery plan for the Venezuelan government. The 
Venezuelan government has been generally in agreement with 
the IMF's recommendations, although they view several of the 
IMF measures as particularly harsh if implemented over too 
short a period of time. 
In synthesis the IMF recommended that the government: (10) 
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1. Cut state spending substantially; 
2. Institute new taxes, especially a sales or value-added 
tax; 
3. Revoke subsidies on domestic oil prices, bringing 
them up to international levels; 
4. Move to a unified exchange rate as quickly as pos-
sible, preferably opting for a single floating rate guided by 
a target for international reserves; 
5. Eliminate domestic price controls and most bans on 
imported goods; 
6. Continue allowing free interest rates. 
Venezuela refused to negotiate with the IMF as its creditor 
banks demanded because, with its large oil export revenues, it 
had little need for the relatively small amount of funds which 
the IMF provides or for new money from lender banks. 
As noted above, however, Venezuela took many of the steps 
nations take as part of an IMF-imposed austerity program, 
including cutting back public sector spending and sharply 
devaluing its currency to make exports cheaper and imports 
more expensive. Apparently, these and other measures were 
sufficient to satisfy the concerns of the international financial 
community. 
Venezuela and its major bank lenders reached an agreement 
in principal in September 1984 to stretch out repayment of 
$20. 7 5 billion of the nation's $35 billion in foreign debt over 
the next 12.5 years at a very favorable rate. In fact, this is the 
first major accord between a debtor nation and its bankers 
that has not been made in tandem with an austerity program 
sanctioned by the IMF. The final debt pact remains conditional 
on the treatment given to Venezuela's $7 to $8 billion in private 
debt. (11) 
In May 1985 the process of restructuring the country's debt 
was finally resolved. Negotiations between the banks and the 
government had bogged down' while the government worked to 
develop mechanisms that would permit private Venezuelan 
debtors to begin paying their creditors abroad. This is now 
resolved with the government offering the private sector foreign 
exchange at a preferential rate of 4.3 Bs/ per dollar over a five 
year period which began in April 1986. 
The greatest stumbling block to a restructuring agreement 
according to many bankers had been the Lusinchi government's 
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inability to deal effectively with the private sector's debt prob-
lems. In the third quarter of 1984, the government moved to 
provide foreign currency at subsidized rates to aid the private 
sector in serving its $8 billion in foreign debt. Since the private 
sector debt was contracted at Bs 4.3/dollar, many firms would 
be unable to pay it off at the much higher open market rates. 
Under government decrees, certain categories of that debt were 
entitled to foreign exchange at preferential rate for interest 
and, if rescheduled over seven years, for principal. But despite 
repeated pledges that official attention would be focused on the 
private foreign debt, the government's debt registration has 
progressed very slowly, interest payments are not being made 
and there is little indication that formulas are being developed 
that would permit Venezuelan debtor companies to absorb 
foreign exchange losses. 
A major impediment to government action in this area 
stemmed from the fact that many government officials believed 
that the private sector's debt problems were separate from the 
public sector. According to one analysis,(13) this conviction, 
which stemmed partly from traditional anti-business bias on the 
part of many Venezuelan bureaucrats and politicians, reflected 
the Lusinchi government's refusal to acknowledge the state's 
role in the debt crisis. 
Conclusions 
It is apparent from the analysis above that the new Lusinchi 
government will have to refine its policies and take action in an 
environment whose domiant features are: 
1. The need to continue rescheduling the debt in arrears 
and short term maturities; 
2. Low volume of exports and low international oil 
prices; 
3. Severe restraints on the amount of resources avail-
able to the public sector for executing programs and 
reviving the non-petroleum economy; 
4. A foreign exchange budget with little room for the 
impo:rts needed to restore domestic economic activity; 
5. A growing number of price increase applications riot 
resolved by the administered price system, and 
6. High unemployment and depressed real income of 
large segments of the population. 
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In general, most of the Venezuelan government's principal 
goals - economic, industrial and social - had been unfulfilled 
even before the current crisis. Government mismanagement(13) 
rather than longer run trends in the world environment may be 
the major factors responsible for the country's current plight. 
The new restrictions on government spending have clearly 
affected all levels of state activity and will set limits on the 
aspirations of the new administration. Major projects in all areas 
have been slowed by varying degrees or placed on hold until 
conditions improve. 
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